Since the roadside infrastructure and vehicles come from different manufacturers, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) now are extremely heterogeneous. It is difficult to communicate securely for heterogeneous facilities in VANETs because secure communication needs to concurrently realize confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. To meet the above security attributes in one logical step, four bi-directional signcryption schemes are proposed for specific heterogeneous vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communication in this paper. The first scheme supports batch verification, which allows multiple vehicles registered in a public key infrastructure (PKI) system to transmit messages to a receiver in an identity-based cryptosystem (IBC), both which are the mainstream public key cryptosystems. The second scheme supports a sender in a PKI to securely broadcast a message to multiple vehicles in an IBC. The communication direction of the latter two schemes is opposite to the former two schemes (i.e., from IBC to PKI). All these schemes can be proved to satisfy confidentiality and unforgeability based on the assumptions of decisional and computational Diffie-Hellman problems in the random oracle model. Furthermore, numerical analyses and simulation results demonstrate the computation costs, communication costs, storage, and the aggregate ciphertext length of our schemes are better than the existing ones.
Introduction
Smart transportation is one of the most important aspects of smart city, and vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have recently been regarded as a promising smart transportation technique that can provide road safety, traffic management, and so on. VANETs consist of smart vehicles with on-board units (OBUs) and roadside units (RSUs). In VANETs, the vehicles can be regarded as mobile nodes and the communication between these nodes can be conducted by dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) technology [1] . There are two main communication ways: Vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle to vehicle (V2V) [2] . V2V communication can exchange information among neighboring vehicles. V2I communication allows vehicles send messages to RSUs in driving. Vehicles or drivers can obtain the traffic information of a region or even a wider scope. After information integration, V2I provides comprehensive driving guidance and early warning services for each driver, which is more advantageous than V2V communication from this point of view. For example, if a traffic accident happened, the accident vehicles will firstly transmit the accident information to a nearby RSU; next, the RSU broadcasts the information to other RSUs and more vehicles in its management region. All kinds of messages can spread faster to prevent traffic jams because RSUs have higher power and stronger message to a great number of vehicles. Therefore, our schemes are quite suitable for the heterogeneous secure V2I communication. 
Preliminaries

Mathematical Background
Let G1/G2 be the additive/multiplicative group of prime order q and P is a generator of G1; , it is hard to calculate abP.
Formal Definitions
(a) A many-to-one heterogeneous signcryption scheme contains six algorithms, as follows:
Setup: After taking a security parameter l, PKG chooses a master secret key msk and outputs the public system parameters params. PKI-KG: A user in PKI selects a secret key sk and computes the corresponding public key pk. The pk has a certificate issued by the CA.
IBC-KG:
A user in IBC sends his identity ID to the PKG. The PKG calculates the corresponding secret key sk and sends it to the user via a secure channel. Under these circumstances, the user's identity ID naturally served as his public key pk.
Signcrypt: Input params, a message m, a sender's secret key ski, a recipient's public key pkr emits a signcryption ciphertext 
Preliminaries
Mathematical Background
Let G 1 /G 2 be the additive/multiplicative group of prime order q and P is a generator of G 1 ; e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is referred as a bilinear map if it meets the attributes as follows:
(1) Bilinearity: ∀P, Q ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * q , e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab .
(2) Non-degeneracy: There exist P, Q ∈ G 1 , s.t. e(P, Q) ∈ 1 G 2 .
(3) Computability: There is an algorithm to calculate e(P, Q) ∈ G 2 , ∀P, Q ∈ G 1 .
Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDHP): For a tuple (P, aP, bP, cP) ∈ G 1 , where P as the generator of G 1 having order q and a, b, c ∈ Z * q , it is difficult to decide whether ab = cmodq is held. Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP): For a tuple (P, aP, bP) ∈ G 1 , where P as the generator of G 1 having order q and a, b ∈ Z * q , it is hard to calculate abP.
Formal Definitions
IBC-KG:
Signcrypt: Input params, a message m, a sender's secret key sk i , a recipient's public key pk r emits a signcryption ciphertext σ i .
Aggregate-Verify: The algorithm firstly aggregate n ciphertexts
to a final ciphertext σ. Then, it verifies the validity of aggregate signcryption σ and outputs true or false.
Unsigncrypt: Input σ, the sender's public key pk i , the recipient's secret key sk r , outputs {m i } n i=1 or ⊥ that means decryption failure.
(b) A one-to-many heterogeneous signcryption scheme contains five algorithms, as follows:
The algorithms of Setup, PKI-KG, and IBC-KG are the same as those in (a). Signcrypt: Input params, a message m, the sender's secret key sk, and multiple receivers' public keys pk r i n i=1 , then the algorithm computes a signcryption ciphertext σ and sends it to receivers. Unsigncrypt: Each receiver takes σ and the corresponding secret keys sk r i as inputs, then computes the broadcasting message m after a series of verifications.
Here, we omit the security model of heterogeneous signcryption scheme because of the limited space.
Four Heterogeneous Signcryption Schemes for V2I Communication Scenarios
In this section, four heterogeneous signcryption schemes are presented to support secure heterogeneous V2I communication. For brevity, we make PKI→IBC to indicate a sender in a PKI system transmits a message to a recipient in an IBC. In turn, IBC→PKI indicates a sender registered in an IBC transmits a message to a receiver in a PKI system. Many-to-one or one-to-many means the sender is multiple or single, and the receiver is single or multiple, which correspond to the two most common scenarios extracted from real V2I communication. The first scheme is called MOHSC-I (many-to-one heterogeneous signcryption), which is suitable for an RSU in an IBC to receive n ciphertexts of {m i } n i=1 from n vehicles who are in a PKI system. In turn, the second construction is named OMHSC-I (one-to-many heterogeneous signcryption), which is suitable for the condition that an RSU in a PKI system to broadcast the cipher of m to n vehicles who are in IBC. The direction of the latter two schemes is opposite to the former schemes i.e., from IBC to PKI. The third scheme is named MOHSC-II (many-to-one heterogeneous signcryption) and the fourth construction is called OMHSC-II (one-to-many heterogeneous signcryption).
PKI→IBC Many-to-One Signcryption (MOHSC-I)
Setup: Input a security parameter l, PKG selects the additive/multiplicative group G 1 /G 2 of prime order q (P be a generator of G 1 ), a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , and three cryptographic hash functions
Then, it selects s ∈ Z * q randomly as the master secret key and computes the master public key P pub = sP . Finally, PKG will publish params = {q, G 1 , G 2 , e, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 } while keeping s secret.
PKI-KG:
A vehicle V in the PKI selects x V ∈ Z * q randomly as the secret key sk V and calculates pk V = x V P as the public key. Let V i 's public/secret key is pk i = x i P/sk i = x i below.
IBC-KG: An RSU in an IBC first sends its identity ID r to the PKG, then PKG calculates the secret key sk ID r = sH 1 (ID r ) = sQ ID r , and transmits sk ID r to RSU via a secure channel. Let the identity of RSU be ID r and the public/secret key pk r = H 1 (ID r ) = Q r /sk r = sQ r below.
Signcrypt: Taking params, a random message m i , the sender V i 's secret key sk i , the receiver RSU's public key pk r as inputs, the algorithm performs the following steps:
1.
Randomly choose r i ∈ Z * q and calculate R i = r i pk i ; 2.
Calculate k i = e(r i sk i P pub , pk r ),
Output the signcryption ciphertext σ i = (R i , c i , S i ) to a nearby RSU.
Aggregate-Verify:
A receiver RSU firstly act as an aggregate signcryption generator to save the verification costs. After receiving multiple ciphertexts σ i = (R i , c i , S i ) (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), the RSU computes S = n i=1 S i , and get the final aggregate signcryption ciphertext σ = (R 1 , . . . , R n , c 1 , . . . , c n , S). Then, the RSU performs the following procedures to verify the ciphertext σ by using n sender vehicles' public keys pk i n i=1 , the aggregate signcryption ciphertext σ and the receiver RSU's public key pk r .
1.
Compute
Verify
h i pk i , P pub );
3.
If (1) is held, emits true, which means σ is valid. Otherwise, emits false and abort.
Unsigncrypt: If Aggregate-Verify algorithm emits true, the receiver RSU's performs the following steps based on the aggregate signcryption σ and its secret key sk r .
1.
Calculate
2.
, and get the message m i .
PKI→IBC One-to-Many Signcryption (OMHSC-I)
The Setup is the same as the above MOHSC-I algorithm, except the PKI-KG and IBC-KG algorithms have slight changes, i.e., the sender RSU's public/secret key pk = xP/sk = x in PKI and n receivers V i 's key pairs
Signcrypt: Taking params, a random message m, the RSU's secret key sk, multiple receivers' public keys pk ri n i=1 as input, the algorithm performs the following steps (repeat 2, 3 steps n times):
Choose a random r ∈ Z * q and compute R = r · pk; 2.
, where Ω is a label which includes message about how c i and S i are associated with the receivers.
Unsigncrypt:
Any receiver V i takes (R, c i , S i ) from σ according to the label Ω. Input V i 's secret keys sk ri , the sender's pk and params, then the algorithm executes the following procedures:
1.
Verify e(S i , P) = e(h i · pk, P pub );
If (3) is established, emits true which means σ is valid. Or else, emits false and abort. 3.
4.
Compute m = c i ⊕ H 2 (k i ), and get the message m.
IBC→PKI Many-to-One Signcryption (MOHSC-II)
The Setup is the same as the above MOHSC-I algorithm. PKI-KG and IBC-KG algorithms have slight changes, i.e., the sender V i 's key pair (pk i = H 1 (ID i ) = Q i ,sk i = sQ i ) in an IBC, the recipient RSU's public/secret key (pk r = x r P/sk r = x r ) in a PKI system. Signcrypt: Taking params, a random message m i , V i 's secret key sk i , and RSU's public key pk r as inputs, the algorithm executes the following procedures:
Select a random r i ∈ Z * q and compute R i = r i P pub ; 2.
Compute k i = e(pk r , r i sk i ),
Transmit the signcryption ciphertext σ i = (R i , c i , S i ) to a nearby RSU.
Aggregate-Verify: Upon receiving the ciphertexts {σ
, the RSU computes S = n i=1 S i to get the final aggregate signcryption ciphertext σ = (R 1 , . . . , R n , c 1 , . . . , c n , S). Then, the RSU executes the following procedures to verify σ by inputting the aggregate signcryption σ, n vehicles' public keys pk i n i=1 and the receiver RSU's public key pk r :
Appl. Sci. 2019, 9, 3131 7 of 15
1.
3.
If (5) is held, emits true, which means σ is valid. Otherwise, emits false and abort.
Unsigncrypt: If the Aggregate-Verify algorithm outputs true, the receiver RSU takes the aggregate signcryption ciphertext σ, its secret key sk r and n vehicles' public keys pk i n i=1 as inputs, then performs as follows:
IBC→PKI One-to-Many Signcryption (OMHSC-II)
The Setup is the same as the above MOHSC-I algorithm. PKI-KG and IBC-KG algorithms have slight changes, i.e., the sender RSU's key pair is (pk = H 1 (ID) = Q,sk = sQ) in IBC and the receivers V i 's (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) key pairs (pk ri = x ri P, sk ri = x ri ) in PKI.
Signcrypt: Taking params, a random message m, RSU's secret key sk, and multiple receivers' public keys pk ri n i=1 as input, the algorithm performs as follows (repeat 2, 3 steps n times): 1.
Randomly choose r ∈ Z * q and compute R = r · P pub ; 2.
, where Ω is a label, which includes a message about how c i and S i are associated with the receivers. Unsigncrypt: Any receiver V i takes (R, c i , S i ) from σ. Take V i 's secret keys sk ri , the sender's pk, and params as inputs, then this algorithm performs the following steps:
If (7) is held, emits true, which means σ is valid. Or else, emits false and abort. 3.
, and get the message m.
Security Proof
The correctness and security of our proposed schemes will be discussed in this section.
Correctness
A. The correctness of the Equations (1) and (2) in HMOSC-I are proven below.
h i pk i , P pub )
k i = e(r i sk i P pub , pk r ) = e(r i x i sP, pk r ) = e(r i x i P, sQ r ) = e(r i pk i , sQ r ) = e(R i , sk r ) = k i (10)
B.
Equations (3)- (8) can be easily proved. Here we omit them for the limit space.
Security Proof
In the subsection, we will demonstrate our proposed schemes are secure. For each proposed signcryption scheme, we must prove its confidentiality (i.e., indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, short for IND-CCA2) and unforgeablity (i.e., existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks, short for EUF-CMA) in a random oracle model due to its encryption and signature functions, respectively, which will make our paper very long because we proposed four schemes in all. Therefore, we mainly prove the confidentiality and unforgeability of MOHSC-I (PKI→IBC many-to-one signcryption) scheme as an example to illustrate our reduction idea. In the following, t m and t p indicate the time to calculate one scalar multiplication and a bilinear pairing in G 1 , respectively, and n is the number of messages.
Theorem 1. (Confidentiality of MOHSC-I scheme):
A is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary with an advantage ε against the IND-CCA2 security within running time t, and asking at most q i times H i (i = 1, 2, 3) queries, q k times key-generation queries, q u times unsigncrypt queries, then there exists an algorithm C that can solve a DDHP instance with probability ε ≥ τ(1 − τ)
Proof. Here, we show how C uses A to settle a given DDHP example (P, aP, bP, cP).
Initial: C firstly executes the Setup algorithm to set P pub =aP and PKI-KG algorithm to get n
, then sends the system parameters and
to A. Phase 1: C keeps the lists L 1 , L 2 , and L 3 to simulate H 1 , H 2 , and H 3 oracles. Assume that H 1 queries are different and the challenged identity ID * r is sent to H 1 sometime. A queries H 1 (ID) before ID is applied to other inquiries.
-H 1 queries: The list L 1 with structure {ID r , α r , Q r , sk r , ξ r } is maintained by C. When A performs the query with ID r , C examines whether {ID r , α r , Q r , sk r , ξ r } is already in L 1 . If so, C returns Q r to A. Otherwise, C flips a coin ξ r ∈ {0, 1} that returns 0 with possibility τ (which will be determined later) and 1 with possibility 1 − τ:
Otherwise, C chooses a random α i ∈ Z * p , computes Q r = α r P, sk r = α r aP, adds {ID r , α r , Q r , sk r , ξ r } to L 1 , and returns Q r to A.
-H 2 queries: The list L 2 has the tuples of k i , ρ i , which is maintained by C. When A submits a k i and issues H 2 query, the same answer from L 2 will be given if the query has been queried before. Otherwise, C chooses ρ i ∈ {0, 1} n at random, then adds k i , ρ i into L 2 and sends ρ i to A.
-H 3 queries: The list L 3 has the tuples of pk i , pk r , R i , c i , h i . When A issues a query pk i , pk r , R i , c i to H 3 , C examines whether pk i , pk r , R i , c i , h i is already in L 3 ; if so, C returns h i to A. Otherwise, C chooses a random value h i ∈ Z * q as answer and adds pk i , pk r , R i , c i , h i to L 3 . -Key-generation queries: When A performs the query with IDr, if ID r = ID * r , C returns ⊥. Otherwise, C requests a H 1 query at first and gets {ID r , α r , Q r , sk r , ξ r } from L 1 list. Then, C returns D r .
-
Unsigncrypt queries: A gives the recipient V r 's identity ID r and a ciphertext σ.
, sk ID r ) and returns the corresponding results.
Challenge: A produces two equal length plaintexts (m i0, m i1 ) and a receiver's identity ID * r , which will be challenged. If ID r ID * r , C outputs ⊥. Otherwise, C selects a bit β ∈ {0, 1} and r * i ∈ Z * q randomly, calculates
, . . . , c * n , S * ) to A. Phase 2: A can make a mass of queries as Phase 1. However, A cannot submit the key-generation query on ID * r and the unsigncrypt query on σ * to obtain the plaintexts. Guess: A outputs the bit β after enough inquiries. If β = β , C emits 1, which means (P, aP, bP, cP) are DH tuples. Otherwise, it outputs 0, which means the (P, aP, bP, cP) are random tuples. If A's guess is correct, A should have asked H 2 oracle with e(r * Further, we will analyze the probability of C success. Define the events E 1 , E 2 E 3 , and E 4 in the following: E 1 : A does not perform the key-generation query with identity ID * r . E 2 : C does not abort the unsigncryption queries. E 3 : A selects ID * r as the recipient's identity during the challenge phase. E 4 : A can successfully guess β = β . C succeeds if the aforementioned events happen. It is easy to get Pr[
The computation time of C comes from A's computation time. We can get that 2, 2 scalar multiplications and 1 pairing calculation are needed in the H 1 query, key generation query, unsigncrypt query. So, the time of C solving the DDHP instance is t ≤ t + O(q u )t p + O(2q H 1 + 2q k )t m .
Theorem 2. (Unforgeability of MOHSC-I scheme):
F is a forger with a non-negligible advantage ε to forge an aggregate signcryption of the MOHSC-I scheme within running time t, and F requests q i queries to H i (i = 1, 2, 3) oracles, q k queries to key-generation oracle, q s queries to signcrypt oracle, then the CDHP will be settled by an algorithm C with probability ε ≤ ετ(1 − τ)
Proof. Here, we show that how C uses F to settle a given CDHP example (P, aP, bP).
Initial: C executes the Setup algorithm to sets Ppub = aP, then transmits params and s to F. C also executes the PKI-KG algorithm and sends the senders' public keys pk * i n i=1 to F. Attack: C keeps four lists L 1 , L 2 , L 3 , and L k to simulate the hash oracles H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , and the keygeneration oracle.
-
The list L 1 with structure {ID r , α r , Q r , D r } is maintained byC. C randomly chooses α r ∈ Z * p and computes Q r = α r P,D r = α r aP. Then, it adds {ID r , α r , Q r , D r } to L 1 list and returns Q r, D r . -H 2 queries and H 3 queries are the same as in Theorem 1, so we will not describe the details. -Key-generation queries: The list L k with structure ID i , x i , pk i , sk i , d i is maintained by C. When F requests the query with ID r , C examines whether ID i , x i , pk i , sk i , d i is already in L k . If so, C transmits pk i and sk i to F. Otherwise, C flips a coin d i ∈ {0, 1} that returns 0 with probability τ and 1 with probability 1 − τ. 
, ID * r ) have never been asked in the Signcrypt queries.
. . , n), C continues. Otherwise, C aborts. Since σ * meets the Equation (1), then
Since pk * 1 = bP, P pub = aP and pk * i = x * i P for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n, it can be transformed into:
Hence, C can compute
Further, we will analyze the possibility of C success. Define the events E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 in the following:
E 1 : C does not abort all queries of key-generation. E 2 : F produces a valid and nontrivial forged aggregate ciphertext. E 3 : E 2 happens, and
. C is successful as long as the above events happened. The probability is Pr[E 1 ∧ E 2 ∧ E 3 ]. We know that
The computation time of C comes from F's computation time, which contains the time C responses queries and the time that C calculates the CDHP example. We can get that 2, 1, 2 scalar multiplications are needed in the H 1 query, key-generation query and signcrypt query, respectively. In addition, 1 pairing calculation is needed in the signcrypt query. n+1 scalar multiplication is needed in C calculating the CDHP example. Therefore, the CDHP example will be settled within time
The proof process of confidentiality and unforgeability MOHSC-II, OMHSC-I, and OMHSC-II are very similar to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively. Therefore, here we omit the detailed proof due to the limited space. Figure 2 gives a specific application scenario of the proposed schemes. If vehicle V A collides with vehicle V B , V A , V B , and V C signcrypt the traffic information including collision messages to a nearby RSU by our many-to-one signcyption schemes (MOHSC-I or MOHSC-II) just in order to avoid traffic jams, and these steps are repeated in a short time interval according to DSRC protocol [1] . Then, the nearby RSU unsigncrypted the messages from V A , V B , and V C after authenticating the messages integrity and vehicles' identities, which is just to ensure that the vehicles will be responsible for messages. Further, by using our one-to-many signcryption schemes (OMHSC-I or OMHSC-II), the RSU signcrypts and broadcasts the integrated information to other adjacent vehicles in time and makes them go around early. As a result, other cars can avoid joining this traffic congestion and make traffic management more convenient. Compared with the other current broadcast technology, our schemes can guarantee the integrity and tamper-resistance of message and the authentication of message sources, which can improve the credibility of message.
Performance Analysis
are very similar to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively. Therefore, here we omit the detailed proof due to the limited space. Figure 2 gives a specific application scenario of the proposed schemes. If vehicle VA collides with vehicle VB, VA, VB, and VC signcrypt the traffic information including collision messages to a nearby RSU by our many-to-one signcyption schemes (MOHSC-I or MOHSC-II) just in order to avoid traffic jams, and these steps are repeated in a short time interval according to DSRC protocol [1] . Then, the nearby RSU unsigncrypted the messages from VA, VB, and VC after authenticating the messages integrity and vehicles' identities, which is just to ensure that the vehicles will be responsible for messages. Further, by using our one-to-many signcryption schemes (OMHSC-I or OMHSC-II), the RSU signcrypts and broadcasts the integrated information to other adjacent vehicles in time and makes them go around early. As a result, other cars can avoid joining this traffic congestion and make traffic management more convenient. Compared with the other current broadcast technology, our schemes can guarantee the integrity and tamper-resistance of message and the authentication of message sources, which can improve the credibility of message. To guarantee the authenticity and confidentiality of message, the sender signcrypts message in our schemes. Upon receiving messages from many vehicles, the RSU first verifies the authenticity of these messages and then discards the error or distorted messages. Although some methods in [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] achieve heterogeneous communication, they have different disadvantages, which are given in Related Work. The function comparisons of all the schemes are depicted in Table 1 . In addition, To guarantee the authenticity and confidentiality of message, the sender signcrypts message in our schemes. Upon receiving messages from many vehicles, the RSU first verifies the authenticity of these messages and then discards the error or distorted messages. Although some methods in [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] achieve heterogeneous communication, they have different disadvantages, which are given in Related Work. The function comparisons of all the schemes are depicted in Table 1 . In addition, Tables 2 and 3 and Figures 3 and 4 mainly focus on the comparison of computation costs, Figures 5 and 6 give the comparison of energy consumption because both vehicles and RSUs are computation-limited and energy-constrained devices, and the computation costs and energy consumption directly affect the practicability of our schemes. Table 2 .
Computation comparisons (public key infrastructure (PKI)→ identity-based cryptosystem (IBC)). energy consumption of communicating a one-byte message is 0.071 mJ). Combined with the ciphertext length in Table 1 and the common assumptions that |G1| = 160 bits and |m| = 160 bits, which can be reduced to 20 bytes, the communication energy consumption of HSC-I, MHSC, MOHSC-I, HOOSC, HSC-II, and MOHSC-II schemes are ( As can be seen from the Tables 1-3 and Figures 3-6 , our schemes have the minimum aggregate ciphertext length, total computation costs, and total energy consumption among these schemes. It is very viable and sound for the practical application of VANETs. From Table 1 , we see only the schemes from [25] and our schemes can achieve bi-directional heterogeneous communication. Since our MOHSC-I and MOHSC-II schemes simultaneously send n messages but the schemes in [23] [24] [25] send one message to the receiver, their ciphertexts length should be multiplied by n just to ensure the fairness of comparisons. Obviously the aggregate ciphertext length from n messages in our MOHSC-I and MOHSC-II schemes is the shortest, regardless of the size of m and G 1 that are selected. So, the communication costs and storage in our schemes have also been reduced.
Conclusions
In Tables 2 and 3 , t m , t p , t inv , and t e , respectively, represent the time of performing a scalar multiplication, one pairing calculation in G 1 , an inverse operation in Z * q , and an exponent operation in G 2 individually. We do not consider other less time-consuming operations, such as the XOR operation. For the fairness of comparison, we extend schemes in [23, 25, 26] to n senders sending n messages to a receiver in Tables 2 and 3 . Since other schemes in [23, 26] only provide one-way heterogeneous communication, the comparisons are divided into PKI→IBC in Table 2 and IBC→PKI in Table 3 just for more scientific and elaborate results.
From Tables 2 and 3 , we can see our MOHSC-I and MOHSC-II schemes require a smaller total computation time (the sum of PKI setup, IBC setup, signcryption, and unsigncryption) when n messages are involved. The more intuitive analyses are given in Figures 3 and 4 for schemes in [23, 25, 26] and our schemes. We implement the experiment on MICA2 platform (same as [24] ). We can get t p , t e , and t m takes 1.9 s, 0.9 s, and 0.81 s, respectively [24] . Note that a t inv operation needs roughly 0.9 s, although, theoretically, a t inv operation is more time-consuming than a t e operation. Finally, according to Tables 2 and 3 , we can compute the total computation time of HSC-I, MHSC, MOHSC-I, HOOSC, HSC-II, and MOHSC-II are 2n × 1.9 + (2n + 3n) × 0.9 + 6n × 0.81 = 13.16ns, (n + 2) × 1.9 + 2n × 0.9 + 7n × 0.81 = 9.37n + 3.8s, (2n + 2) × 1.9 + 6n × 0.81 = 8.66n + 3.8s, 2n × 1.9 + (2n + 4n) × 0.9 + 7n × 0.81 = 14.87ns, 2n × 1.9 + (2n + 3n) × 0.9 + 6n × 0.81 = 13.16ns, and (2n + 2) × 1.9 + 6n × 0.81 = 8.66n + 3.8s, respectively. The comparisons of total computational time are shown in Figures 3 and 4 .
Since vehicles and RSUs are both energy-constrained devices, we must consider the energy consumption. According to [24] , a t p operation consumes 45.6 mJ, a t e operation consumes 21.6 mJ, and a t m operation consumes 19.44 mJ; here, we suppose t inv also consumes 21.6 mJ. So, the computational energy consumption of HSC-I, MHSC, HMOSC-I, HOOSC, HSC-II, and HMOSC-II schemes are 2n × 45.6 + (2n + 3n) × 21.6 + 6n × 19.44 = 315.84n mJ, (n + 2) × 45.6 + 2n × 21.6 + 7n × 19.44 = 224.88n + 91.2 mJ, (2n + 2) × 45.6 + 6n × 19.44 = 207.84n + 91.2 mJ, 2n × 45.6 + (2n + 4n) × 21.6 + 7n × 19.44 = 356.88n mJ, 2n × 45.6+ (2n + 3n) × 21.6 + 6n × 19.44 = 315.84n mJ, and (2n + 2) × 45.6 + 6n × 19.44 = 207.84n + 91.2 mJ, respectively. For the communication energy consumption, as in [24] , a sensor consumes 0.052 mJ and 0.019 mJ to transmit and receive a 1-byte message (namely the total energy consumption of communicating a one-byte message is 0.071 mJ). Combined with the ciphertext length in Table 1 and the common assumptions that |G 1 | = 160 bits and |m| = 160 bits, which can be reduced to As can be seen from the Tables 1-3 and Figures 3-6 , our schemes have the minimum aggregate ciphertext length, total computation costs, and total energy consumption among these schemes. It is very viable and sound for the practical application of VANETs.
In the article, two many-to-one heterogeneous signcryption schemes and two one-to-many heterogeneous signcryption schemes for secure V2I communication in VANETs are proposed. These schemes can all construct a secure channel between heterogeneous vehicles and a RSU to support confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation services in a logical step. Specifically, the many-to-one signcryption schemes adopt the aggregate method to support batch verification when multiple vehicles in the PKI (IBC) system transmit messages to a nearby RSU in the IBC (PKI) system, and the one-to-many schemes support a RSU in the PKI (IBC) broadcasts a message to multiple vehicles registered in IBC (PKI) system. All the schemes can be proven to be IND-CCA2 and EUF-CMA secure. Furthermore, the numerical analyses and simulation results, which are shown in Tables 1-3 and Figures 3-6 , can demonstrate the aggregate ciphertext length, communication costs, total computation costs, and total energy consumption of our schemes are better than the existing ones. The analyses show our schemes are more suitable for the practical heterogeneous V2I communication in VANETs. 
